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Abstract 
The victorious conclusion of the war, coupled with a great democratising reform for the 
peace, created a sense of expectation that the parliament elected in December 1918 could not 
more starkly have disappointed. There was widespread shock at the overnight transformation 
of party politics, and general disorientation and speculation. To the central criticism that the 
1918 Reform Act had produced a deeply unrepresentative and therefore undemocratic House 
of Commons, came complaints that the legislature had become merely an appendage of the 
executive, and parliamentary government had been supplanted by party government. Many 
opined that the authority of the House of Commons had been undermined. This article 
considers how the implications of the Act were envisaged, and how they were experienced 
and reported. It will look at the legislature that resulted, its members, and how they adapted 
to and changed its procedures and conventions. Finally it will reflect on the politics of the 
impact of the Reform Act, on the parties, on their policies, and on a new political 
environment that had been created. Through their writings at the time and their reflections 
subsequently, those who were Members, and those who were observers, of Parliament 
testified as to how they felt the House of Commons had changed as a result of the impact of 
the 1918 Reform Act.  
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‘The magnitude of the measure is so obvious as to be almost platitudinous; its significance, 
though not less certain, is perhaps more subtle.’1 
 
I 
 
‘We have to face this morning the spectacle of the old British political system in ruins’, one 
newspaper announced when finally the results, if not the consequences, of the General 
Election were known.2 A great ‘reform parliament’ – not to mention a ‘victory parliament’ – 
could expect to be exalted by high purposes; none served with such disrepute as that which 
followed the 1918 Reform Act. ‘After the victory and the brief jubilations,’ a Member 
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remembered, ‘there followed a period of confusion and squalor which one might have 
expected only in defeat.’3 ‘It is mediocrity personified’, opined another editorial, a year later.4 
It ‘was quite the wickedest I have known’, recalled one Member of Parliament who sat in ten; 
‘Some called them the hard-faced men, I should have said empty-headed.’5 ‘It had not been 
difficult to get into’, another admitted, ‘provided one stood either as a Conservative or a 
National Liberal and there were many men there uninterested in politics but merely attracted 
by the kudos of being an M.P.’6 The preponderance of Conservatives and National Liberals 
meant the Commons ‘suffered principally from the lack of Parliamentary ability and authority 
in the ranks of the Opposition’; for the Free Liberals and for Labour, Asquith and Adamson 
were likened to Prospero and Caliban.7 Outside, pessimistic screeds proliferated: ‘[g]rave 
dissatisfaction with Parliamentary government is widely felt and expressed’, reflecting the 
‘undoubted decline in the prestige of Parliament’.8 There was ‘popular inattention’, 
‘disconsideration’, even a ‘growing contempt of institutions’.9 The Burke scholar Frank 
Raffety detected a ‘great decline in the influence of the House of Commons’.10 Hard it was 
perhaps that morning to recall during the ‘war parliament’ the recent triumph of peaceful 
progress, that ‘remarkable legislative achievement’, ‘the most comprehensive measure of 
electoral reform enacted’; one which ‘made the whole system of what we regarded as 
democratic representation seem rudimentary.’11 The House of Commons elected in 1918 was 
certainly not what was anticipated from ‘the greatest revolution this country has seen’.12  
Unless by great revolutions was also meant great confusion.  
 
It is actually a perfectly explicable irony that the impact of the Representation of the People 
Act 1918 on the place whence it came and where its consequences were first felt has yet to be 
studied. That one of Britain’s most significant democratising reforms transformed the 
principal legislative chamber of the country is obvious; demonstrating in quite what forms 
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that took is somewhat harder. Its impact being tied neither to a date nor to an issue, the 
evidence is almost all circumstantial; it is hard to disaggregate which aspects of what came 
after were direct consequences of the Act, rather than the consequences of the consequences 
of the Act. Although it created the world that found expression in the Commons, the Act 
itself is metaphorically almost what it was literally: a backdrop, as if democracy were a mise-
en-scène courtesy of the Office of Works and Public Buildings. Once the Act had passed its 
third reading on 7 December 1917, there was scarcely a mention of it – as distinct from its 
effect on the general election known to be impending – in newspapers, in campaign material 
or in the private papers and memoirs of Members, candidates and parliamentary officials; all 
were similarly silent. Significantly, the Act never acquired a moniker. Whereas that of 1832 
was soon thereafter invariably known as the Great Reform Act, the 1867 Act generally called 
the Second Reform Act and that of 1884 usually dubbed the Third, the 1918 Act was rarely 
called the Fourth Reform Act, and almost never by its full name. Variously it was the 
Franchise Act, Reform Act, or Electoral Reform Act. Other measures – pre-eminently the 
Parliament Act 1911 – lived longer in renown. After an initial fanfare of superlatives, more 
usually it was not mentioned at all. 
Other than for those inside it, at the time the doings of the Commons were a 
preoccupation only of journalists and political scientists, for whom the Act prompted a series 
of stock takings and summary reports of varying degrees of portentousness. For subsequent 
scholarship, it was a subject overlooked rather than neglected. The Act is significant because 
it sits at the fulcrum of broader historiographical debates about parties (demographic change, 
the consequences of the war), the results of the 1918 election, and the precise, perhaps 
exaggerated, role of the Act in creating a new electoral environment.13 Few historians have 
been concerned with its immediate impact; in the procedural over the political, and 
challenges to politicians and to party were more vital subjects than whatever changes there 
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may have been in or to the Commons itself. Once the Parliament was elected, the parties 
sought to adapt to the new system. The Commons itself was almost taken for granted. 
Retrospective studies have tended to be longue durée, or to deem other issues to be more 
prominent, or to identify changes the impacts of which were more discernible.14 The 1918 
Parliament as such proved to be not especially privileged; centennial interest began to rectify 
that.15 Aspects that might still profitably be considered include the Act and its implications, 
as envisaged and experienced; the assembly it produced, its conventions, and the character 
and status of its members; the politics of impact, in terms of parties and their policies, and the 
meaning of the House of Commons after the 1918 Reform Act. 
 
II 
 
Even had it wanted to, the House of Commons was not to resume from where it had left off in 
August 1914. Preliminary to a new, and likely post-war, Parliament, Speaker Lowther had 
chaired an inquiry – the first Speaker’s Conference – into electoral reform, the report of 
which he advised the Prime Minister to make public.16 From its recommendations, Members 
went on to show, Sir William Bull told them, ‘characteristic British phlegm when, in the 
midst of a great war, we deliberately decided to have a Reform Bill’.17 Two major anomalies 
had survived the previous one: the continuation of plural voting, and the denial of votes for 
women. The Conference reached broad agreement on universal male suffrage, voter 
registration, plural voting, university representation, redistribution of seats, adoption of 
alternative vote for single member constituencies, and even the enfranchisement of women 
who had attained a specific age.18 The subsequent Bill embodied those recommendations, 
leaving proportional representation and votes for women to a free vote: to expedite its 
progress, electoral reform was decoupled from that of franchise; PR was lost, for Labour ‘the 
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one serious blot in what is otherwise a most comprehensive Franchise Reform’.19 While 
political scientists recognised the form as being of much broader modern constitutionalism, 
what was bullishly exceptionalist was that though the Act bore great fidelity to the report it 
represented no consistent body of principles; it was a progressive more than a radical 
measure, as was noted at the time.20 
There was general agreement that the Act would mean profound change, though little 
consensus as to what that change would be.21 The Act was recognised as being more than 
merely a piece of franchise legislation; upon the basis of a doubled electorate ‘it erects an 
electoral system which is almost entirely new.’22 A ‘greater Reform Act than any that have 
gone before it’ had been passed ‘without more than a ripple of excitement, dealing with 
questions which in pre-war days would have aroused bitterest feelings’.23 The Act repealed in 
whole or in part over one hundred statutes, changed the conduct of elections, and transformed 
the character and size of the electorate, tidying up the ‘chaotic concretion’ of other acts and 
measures to extend the franchise.24 The most significant outcome of the Act was the 
redistributing, rationalising, and equalising of constituencies (‘a sort of jigsaw puzzle’, 
thought the Speaker, ‘though rather more interesting’25). The electorate was now so large that 
the state made it its business to ensure that qualified people were registered. The prospect of 
an election determined by ‘slavish adherence’ to the report struck ‘terror in the soul of the 
party agent’ standing ‘on the brink of the unknown.’26 In addition to commentarial surveys, 
guides to the perfecting of the new electoral machinery rapidly materialised.27 With election 
expenditure now having to go through the agent, electioneering interest groups were 
cauterized; through the requirement of a £150 deposit the Act introduced a restriction – a 
capital requirement – on standing for election rare in democracies.28 The new legal maxima 
on expenses benefitted the coming party, Labour, although the result of the election ensured 
that the benefit was initially well-disguised.29 With the Conservatives, the socialists went on 
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to defend the system by which they would be over represented; the attractions of electoral 
reform waned for Labour as they waxed for the Liberals, who in 1922 belatedly included it in 
their manifesto. The Conservatives had been fearful more of the electoral consequences – the 
effect of the uncouth and the un-male – than of the institutional ones. As it was, not all the 
new male voters were working class, and only older women were enfranchised. 
Redistribution proved a boon as the areas of growth were where Tories were stronger, and the 
Act still retained the plural franchise in the form of university Members and business votes. 
With the self-denying absence of the 73 Irish Sinn Fein MPs, to Conservatives the new 
democracy could appear more propitious than the old. 
When it came, as one candidate recalled, the ‘outstanding feature of the 1918 election 
was apathy’.30 With voting on a single day, the election created a national campaign, albeit 
one where activity was compromised by shortages of paper and petrol, and the outcome by 
questions of legitimacy. Only half of voters voted, and ‘a bare quarter of the electorate’, to 
the disgust of one newspaper, voted for the government. Turnout was 58.9 per cent, by far the 
lowest of any twentieth century election. ‘Not only is Parliament unrepresentative, but the 
people who have got themselves returned to power expressly “wangled” the electorate so that 
Parliament should be unrepresentative’.31 There was much in the contest ‘which redoubled 
little to the credit of “democracy”’, a coalition Conservative, admitted. ‘Our victory proved to 
be too complete.’32 The snap election had been ‘a plan for the extinction of all independent 
opinion,’ for another editorial; ‘there is serious danger that we shall discover too late that the 
credit of Parliament has suffered a disastrous blow’.33 To one Labour man who lost his seat, 
and who risked sounding peevish, it was ‘probably the most grotesque reflection of the votes 
cast which any Parliamentary vote has ever shown’. Ramsay MacDonald went on: ‘there has 
been no Parliament elected in the lifetime of any of us the existence and work of which ought 
to be more firmly challenged’, by the extra-parliamentary, if necessary.34 
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III 
 
From the Public Gallery it was evident that there was more than just a matter of seating 
protocol with which to be contended: there was a new geography of politics. From the Press 
Gallery it was evident that the ‘Opposition front bench has almost completely disappeared’; 
‘Two constitutional parties are virtually wiped out’, the New Statesman observed. ‘These 
results destroy the party system, turning the House of Commons into an annexe of 
Government’.35 The latter found itself embarking ‘on the experiment of governing a country 
without an Opposition’.36 Even the most supportive press admitted that ‘the size of the 
majority and the absence of any man of parliamentary standing to lead His Majesty’s 
Opposition are grave evils.’37 Remarkably, with estimates varying between 250 to over 400 
‘no official or even semi-official pronouncement has been made as to what the majority really 
is’.38 
‘This congested House’ first met on 4 February.39 Because of a London underground 
strike many Members were late arriving, and there were rumours of a power cut by strikers to 
prevent them meeting at all.40 The chamber ‘was a seething mass of humanity’, Punch’s 
William Locker observed, ‘enough to swamp the floor and surge over into the galleries’ and 
so many Coalitionists that they had to ‘overflow’ to the opposition benches.41 Seating 
remained scarce, and its scarcity contentious. Those who were able to subside had then to 
survive a ventilation system ‘most members feel the effect of … some to the extent that it 
shortens their parliamentary existence, voluntarily or not.’42 In the dark adjacent lobbies one 
new Member discerned ‘a steady stream of beggars, sightseers, would-be statesmen, people 
with grievances, inventors and others seeking relief and advice demand their member’s 
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services.’43 Many attested that as ‘a workshop it is badly equipped; it is overcrowded, and it 
is unhealthy.’44 
It was a neophyte yet aged assemblage.45 Seasoned by life though they may have 
been, in Parliament ‘the majority of the members [were] new and inexperienced, [and] such a 
one-sided House was not a good training for them. There was a tendency to disregard 
traditions and precedents’.46 ‘It was not, as a rule, a well-attended House’, as was apparent 
from the Press Gallery. ‘An unusually small proportion of the new men, unskilled and 
unpractised, were desirous of Parliamentary distinction or interested in everyday work.’47 
Once questions were over, a ‘House of fifty or sixty is not noticeably thin’.48 Some blamed 
the Members’ dramatically improved social and leisure facilities of bars, restaurants and 
games rooms.49 Despite being salaried since 1911, Members without private means or an 
auxiliary profession found it hard to live on, and so after Labour Party representations, 
expenses were paid to cover transport between the Commons and their constituency. That 
provision corresponded with the stated intention of Labour members that they should be 
constituency representatives, with the Commons both their ‘dwelling place’ and ‘platform’.50 
Their request that salaries were paid from the date of the declaration of the poll rather than 
that of the oath being taken was however refused by a Speaker worried at a public ‘already 
rather restive at the payment of salaries’; only after the oath could the £150 deposit be 
reclaimed, and ‘in their zeal to be in a position to reimburse themselves Members crowded in 
such numbers to the tables that there was some danger that they would be overturned.’51 
Those on whom the Act had the greatest impact played no part. The ingress of the 
forty per cent of men who had been unenfranchised was much more apparent than that of the 
100 per cent of women who had been (those under the age of thirty remained voteless). Of 
1,623 candidates in the election, seventeen were women; only one was elected, and she 
declined to take her seat. In the event that one might, there was the urgent provision of 
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‘lavatory accommodation’ – albeit for numbers unknown – and ‘Quarters for the Feminine 
Contingent’, with a refreshment room ‘decorated with portraits of famous men’.52 The Act 
notwithstanding, women still, as one authority ambiguously put it, ‘were incapable of being 
elected.’53 The corrective Parliament (Qualification of Women) Bill, which would not long 
before have ‘been laughed out of the House’, in 1918 ‘was carried, after a couple of hours, by 
an overwhelming majority.’54 Nevertheless, ‘[i]t took women quite a long time to get 
accustomed to politics and the atmosphere of Westminster’, and not a few men, some of 
whom were at least partly reconciled to the opposite sex by the sudden ease of locating a hat 
when raising a point of order.55 
 
When, in 1931, a cabinet minister at the dispatch box was asked a question about the removal 
of two trees in Green Park in consequence of a proposed widening of Piccadilly, followed by 
a question about the granting of a new constitution for Burma, it was clear to him at least that 
the Commons was swamped in more than one sense. Central to one post-war critique from 
the Webbs was ‘the submergence of the House of Commons in the flood of government 
activity’.56 The cabinet minister in question concluded that the ‘consequence is that hardly 
any of the work is done properly.’57 Government programmes in the 1918 Parliament were 
‘uncomfortably full’.58 That that Parliament, in addition to non-legislative business, placed an 
average of 79 Acts annually on the Statute Book – a considerable increase compared with the 
1910 Parliament – was at least in part a reflection of the significant procedural changes 
effected within days of the session beginning. Though not dependent on the Act, they and 
their timing were products of the opportunity it provided. The Government continued the 
trend to take time for its business from that of Private Members. The system of Standing 
Committees was extended, relieving parliamentary business by sitting simultaneously with 
the House to consider bills as a matter of course. Changes to Standing Orders provided a 
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technical, strictly regulated, enhancement of the old system. By giving the Speaker power to 
select amendments for debate, the House accepted arrangements that would limit individual 
members’ ability to delay or disrupt the passage of a bill by flooding the order paper with 
amendments.59 Not long into the Parliament the Speaker was presented with a ‘very real and 
present danger’ requiring him ‘to guard the rights and privileges of the Commons against the 
encroachment by the Executive Government.’60 Lowther had been prevailed upon to preside 
over the first two years of the new parliament, and the Prime Minister wanted the Chairman 
of Ways and Means, J.H. Whitley, to succeed him.61 This apparent abuse of authority 
produced a row with accusations of gross violations of the ancient privileges of the Commons 
of which Private Members were the trustees.62 Such desecration notwithstanding, the Prime 
Minister’s nominee prevailed. A member of the Cabinet inadvertently revealed Whitley's 
allure: ‘A minister in charge of a difficult bill and fighting an uphill battle against the clock 
could wish for no better ally.’63 
The abiding antagonism between ‘certainty of business’ and ‘liberty of discussion’ for 
some had been settled. ‘Parliament had little more to do than to ratify the decisions of the 
executive Government,’ one Private Member felt, ‘and Parliament could do little more than 
approve, or disapprove’.64 A Cabinet minister confided ‘legislation is being passed by a mere 
handful of Members’.65 There were signs for many that the Act had produced effectively a 
dictatorship – the Labour leader called it ‘Kaiserism’66 – and that the Commons had become 
‘the charwoman of Whitehall’.67 The position of Leader of the House became more important 
– to the scepticism of some – but with the immediate benefit of ministers more reliably 
circulating important papers to Private Members.68 The Machinery of Government 
Committee recommended as a ‘correlative an increase in the power of the Legislature as the 
check upon the acts and proposals of the Executive’, whilst at the same time not ‘disturbing 
the balance of authority’.69 The sapping of initiative from the Commons – apart from debates 
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over amendments to the Address – was one reason why the executive conceded greater 
interrogative opportunities. The questioning of ministers constituted a ‘Grand Inquest of the 
Nation’ in which Labour Members’ ‘influence of questions on policy and administration’, a 
Clerk averred, was ‘considerable. They are very often the only means available of expressing 
the views of groups of members on the government.’70 So determined was the Speaker to 
include as many as possible that to some the questioning of ministers had been reduced to ‘a 
trivial catechism’.71 Over 200 questions being asked in a day was not uncommon, a ‘growing 
plague’ which led to the eventual remedy of no more than four oral questions being allowed 
to be put down daily, freeing a minister from devoting ‘so much of his valuable time to 
satisfying Parliamentary curiosity’.72 Yet the ventilative functions of Parliament were the 
primary instruments of Private Members.73 Private Members' Bills offered the lowest 
prospect of return of all parliamentary investments, but Labour Members were adept in 
exploiting the ballot as such Bills were the principal way in which they could use their 
platform for the education of public opinion. Those who obtained the highest place had to 
introduce a bill to represent fundamental Party policy even if, therefore, there was no chance 
of it progressing. Friday, the only day when ministers were not expected to attend, effectively 
became the day for debates on Labour party projects or, ‘mere variations on hackneyed party 
themes’.74 
Procedure struck some ‘as being unduly cumbersome,’ not to say obsolete: ‘hours 
marching through the lobbies like sheep through a pen’.75 Stricter whipping had ‘tended to 
turn the average back-bench member in to a voting machine’; when there was a division – the 
result of which was nearly always known beforehand – ‘the absent members pour in from the 
smoke-rooms and elsewhere, and march through the division lobbies’, three quarters of 
whom having ‘not heard a word of the debate’, or, if they were called, ‘find themselves on 
their feet without any remembrance of what their motions are.’76 One new Member reflected 
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how ‘pride is chastened by disillusionment’;77 another of how a Member was swiftly 
disabused ‘of the fancy that he influenced events.’78 ‘Ridiculed and reviled’, Private 
Members ‘are deprived of the authority that they are elected to exercise.’79 One said ‘I used 
to wonder how I ever got here, but now I cannot help wondering how on earth any of the 
others ever managed it.’80 Outside diversions were essential: ‘Complete devotion to the 
pursuit of political life may lead to swifter advancement, but seems inevitably to bring with it 
a loss of sense of proportion’.81 Inside, more than one felt that initiative and independence of 
thought were discouraged.82 Outside, local associations distributed candidate ‘questionnaires’ 
requesting return with detailed replies.83 One Member knew colleagues ‘who bitterly 
regretted’ giving ‘some written pledge or promise which they found it difficult or 
objectionable to have to comply with’; another always refused. ‘I cannot help feeling that 
every Member of the House would be happier in his mind if he could go back to Westminster 
on that explicit understanding’.84 It was the antithesis of direct action. 
 
IV 
 
One of the many the Act generated was ‘an experiment in politics without party’.85 In its 
absence could be heard what the Leader of the House called the ‘clatter outside, which is 
reflected so much in some of the new speeches to which we have listened’, of the press.86 It 
was a clamour to which some suspected the Prime Minister listened more attentively than he 
did to that of Members. It evinced a sense that journalists effectively had supplanted 
Members; indeed, Austen Chamberlain’s ‘corporate feeling of the House’ was felt most when 
the press sought to bully.87 Some saw virtue in the lack of parliamentary opposition, others 
that after years of coalition, government by party was overdue, not least as the present 
government majority was overlarge.88 There were so many Coalitionists it was even unclear 
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where they would sit. Since separation on party lines may ‘create an atmosphere of 
opposition' the Unionist Chief Whip told the Speaker; "it would be wiser for all sections of 
Coalitionists to be mixed up.’89 With such a large majority, discipline was lax, government 
backbenchers rebelling sometimes with immunity and for their own amusement.90 It was a 
problem for the Speaker. Not only were there parties both inside and outside of the 
government, there were ‘a number of groups, Unionists, Liberals, Labour, Nationalists, Sinn 
Feiners, Cooperators etc who may or may not act together, or who may act together on some 
subjects and not on others’, the Speaker told one Member. ‘Events alone and not I can 
determine which of these groups or what combination of groups will eventually become the 
regular opposition or whether there will be a regular opposition.’91 From the aspect of the 
First Commissioner of Works, who had physically to accommodate them, ‘it seems in the 
future we shall have more of the group system, rather than the two Party system of the 
past.’92  
Arithmetic alone meant that ‘the Coalition can safely ignore what such a 
tatterdemalion Opposition chooses to say or do.’93 With the non-return of Asquith and Arthur 
Henderson, there was no obvious leader of it, and the two largest opposition parties in the 
Commons were divided as to which should be the official Opposition. Aware that by-election 
results might lead to a weekly census, Lowther felt his responsibility extended to whom to 
call first. As it was, business was slowed – and Locker inspired – by the Liberal and Labour 
leaders as ‘each of them thinks it necessary to speak whenever the other does, like the hungry 
lions on Afric’s burning shore’.94 The Speaker alternated the roars; attempts similarly to 
divide the opposition whip rooms were abandoned (‘The narrow passage leading down to 
them make it impossible to divide them between 2 without great inconvenience and probably 
friction.’95) The leaders of the groups could sit on the opposition front bench as well as 
members of the previous administration. The Speaker said ‘there would be no official 
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opposition and no person who could claim (or whose claim would be admitted) to be leader 
of His Majesty’s Opposition.’96  
Donald Maclean led the opposition Liberal Party contingent, which although few 
thought ‘that they were the real “Simon Pure”’, with great historical traditions which should 
not be lightly set aside by reason of a passing failure at the polls’.97 Maclean's colleague Sir 
Thomas Whittaker maintained that the Speaker should regard all Liberals as of one party, and 
thus ‘the only possible alternatives to this government would be a Unionist or a Liberal 
Government,’ indeed, the Chairman of the Committee on Parliamentary Procedure went on, 
‘it would appear to be unnecessary and undesirable to depose a great historic party from that 
position simply because … [it] is not quite homogenous in regard to its leadership’.98 
Outnumbered they may have been by the coalition, but Labour still outnumbered the ‘Wee 
Free’ Liberals. The alternative leader of the opposition was thus William Adamson, to some 
ears the personification of the Parliamentary Labour Party. ‘Speech seems hard for him and 
thought harder still’, the Leader of the House told the King; of Adamson’s colleagues ‘the 
average mentality is slow and lacks understanding of even comparatively simple propositions 
and except for the annoyance which obstinacy always causes my personal feeling is that they 
will not be a very formidable opposition’.99 Speaker Lowther found the Labour men ‘slack in 
attendance and ineffective in discussing details’.100 Inside the party, concerns were raised 
about ‘the poor attendance of Members on the Benches and the necessity for better 
organisation’ as well as for individual initiative.101 From outside the Commons, through a 
passing failure at the polls of his own, MacDonald complained that too many Labour men 
‘are not really interested in Parliamentary work, and are not being taught to be interested.’102 
A good parliamentary team increasingly being seen as essential, the Organisation Committee 
stepped in to support Adamson’s scratch efforts. ‘Two clerks, three typists – we cannot do 
with less’, were requested, plus one of the Liberals’ three messengers ‘to fetch members to 
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important divisions’.103 And the National Executive Committee instructed the Parliamentary 
Party to ‘make the necessary arrangements to become the Official Opposition.’104 Thus did 
Adamson assert himself, asking the Speaker before Parliament met to ‘make whatever 
arrangements are necessary for the Party to assume the responsibilities of the Official 
Opposition.’ ‘There is no immediate hurry, of course', Adamson assured him, 'but tomorrow 
would suit us’.105 
‘Tranquillity’ was the Conservative slogan in the subsequent general election, in 
November 1922. Tranquillity triumphed. Yet it was ‘always inevitable that, if an adequate 
constitutional outlet were denied, the demand for drastic changes in the economic system 
would take shape in the industrial field’.106 In 1922, the coming party arrived. More 
numerous and numinous, the Labour benches ‘have been filled, whilst other benches have 
been scantily occupied, the work of the Whips has been reorganised, and in division after 
division we have been able to account for every man … The Labour Party has revived the life 
of Parliament.’107 But then ‘[f]lushed with triumph ... they were speedily disillusioned.’108 
Impatience defined the attitude of many Labour members to parliamentary procedure. 
Edward Fellowes, Assistant Clerk, felt ‘they regarded the rules of debate in the Commons as 
having been framed solely to prevent their freedom of expression’.109 Speaker Whitley 
decided to drive those elected in 1922 ‘with a loose rein’ and for that purpose felt it politic to 
break on occasion with custom.110 Whitley’s secretary felt that ‘he was out to help them to 
take their position as His Majesty’s Opposition’, the Rules of Order and recognized 
Procedures permitting.111 It appeared to others that for the Red Clydesiders, ‘Mr Speaker was 
only a Lord Mayor’.112 The reception that the new Labour members, few of whom had much 
formal education or training, received was, for one of them, ‘contemptuous indifference 
strongly tempered with fear’.113 The roots showed. Fellowes recognised that their ‘experience 
was largely confined to the platform, where interruptions could be dealt with in language 
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which was disorderly in the Commons.’114 For the Speakers, tranquillity came to be a 
reminiscence. When their time came, both were happy to retire.115 
 
V 
 
That the 1918 House of Commons was heralded was partly why it disappointed. One 
newspaper recalled ‘the common cant of the election period. There was to be a "new world", 
and the House of Commons, elected on an extended franchise, was to be representative of 
aspirations and ideals of which the country had become actively conscious during its 
passage.’116 That the Act produced a ‘complete travesty in the House of Commons of the 
verdict of the country’ proved to Asquith, among others, that ‘a not very legitimate use was 
made of it.’117 An Act which settled electoral arrangements for the rest of the century had 
been followed by an election on a system that all had condemned. Its very 
unrepresentativeness meant that the government’s victory lacked moral authority; worse, was 
‘destructive of the representative character of Parliament.’118 Electoral reformers were 
emboldened.119 Some commentators felt that the Act meant that the Commons ‘no longer 
performs some of the functions attributed to it by Bagehot and is not indispensable to the 
performance of any of them’.120 It was incompetent in controlling the executive, had no point 
of view to oppose that of the government, and was ignorant of the principles of parliamentary 
government. Inasmuch as Members reflected anything, they reflected ‘interests’. ‘Women 
produce life, and men produce property,’ Walter Elliott mused, ‘and this is the reason of their 
respective bias, each stressing the value of the effort which they can realise’; by 
enfranchising women the Act ‘very greatly emphasised the position of the Commons as a 
Consumers’ Council’.121 More than after other such Acts, Members ‘had to find means of 
satisfying the whole adult population, many of whom had neither the capacity nor the interest 
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to assess serious arguments.’122 What took place inside the chamber should not be separated 
from how it was considered outside: the specific – its conventions – and the general, ‘its 
special business as a representative Assembly is to explore the causes of discontent, to hear 
and redress grievances, to anticipate and prevent disturbances of the peace’.123 It was clear to 
some that the ‘fair hopes of the fathers of modern democracy have not been fully realized. 
Universal suffrage has not proved to be a universal panacea’.124 Coming at the conclusion of 
the war to end all wars, that may have been fitting. 
Governing had to be adapted to the new conditions. ‘The old oligarchic methods will 
not do’, as a Viscount told a Cabinet Secretary.125 The majority undeservedly conferred on 
the Government threatened the role of the Commons. ‘What the House thinks or feels is no 
longer a question of importance with the government or anyone else’, said the New 
Statesman. ‘The supremacy of the Executive was complete.’126 However propitious some 
Tories may have found democracy to be, others felt that representative government, 
independent and critical thinking, and quality of debate had become neglected, and that 
Parliament must revive to defeat non-democratic ideas, such as direct action.127 For the 
Liberal Ivor Davies, too many Members ‘since 1918 have been shamefully reluctant to act 
according to their consciences’ for fear of ‘a candidate who could be relied upon by their 
Party to toe the line.’128 With payment, perquisites, and presumption on the part of the public, 
came a class of professional politicians. It was this conception not Government which 
subdued Parliament – the Prime Minister’s threat of dissolution, which was simultaneously 
an appeal to the people and a threat to legislators – ‘but the Chief Whip, with his ultimate 
verdict as to the re-election of all’.129 One effect was to strengthen the party machine, not 
only over constituents, but also over Members, who owed their election to it; a new 
oligarchic method. 
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More than being a place merely to raise issues, the House was vaunted as a place to 
do things, but the very purpose of the coming party was in danger of suffocation from the 
parliamentary embrace. For some Labour Members their elevation was consummation. ‘This 
was the House of Commons!’ one remembered exclaiming; ‘I was convinced that the 
workers were right in shaping their course to capture this citadel’.130 Citadel, dwelling place, 
or platform, ‘Socialists', MacDonald pronounced, 'should consider how to perfect the 
system’.131 Their enemy agreed.132 The complaint, as expressed by Austen Chamberlain, was 
that ‘a great loquaciousness has seized upon the House’, thereby providing a measure against 
which to disparage the unpractised Labour men.133 The Act had the effect of emphasising that 
the person chosen by Labour MPs to be parliamentary leader was effectively the party leader; 
in 1921, Adamson was replaced.134 In 1922, the Clydesiders ‘came to Westminster with a 
reputation as revolutionaries’, as Ellen Wilkinson recalled, ‘and the House of Commons, 
which was only used to the solid trade union official type of Labour member, was thrilled to 
find that they really looked the part.’135 With MacDonald as leader, they finally sounded it. 
Yet he appealed to his colleagues ‘for a greater measure of self-restraint and for a realisation 
of the fact that when a Labour government arrives it will be greatly hampered if, in the 
meantime, Parliamentary Government has been destroyed’.136 It was the case that ‘[i]f the 
Party fails in Parliament, it fails in the country, and the dream of a Labour government will 
vanish for a generation.’137 So it was that ‘as the years went by they steadily became more 
and more rigid upholders of the traditions of the house’.as keen to stress that in ‘defending 
Parliamentary method and Parliament, one must be careful not to be committed to defend 
Parliament in its existing form,’ but nor should anything be done to weaken the power of 
Labour for when it did win a majority.138 The House of Lords excepted, on parliamentary 
reform the party’s 1918 constitution was silent given that its ‘repeated demands largely [had 
been] conceded’ by the Act.139 In consequence of the concerns that the Commons was 
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becoming overwhelmed with reconstructing a nation and running an empire, some advocated 
geographical, if not functional, devolution, and Members agreed to ‘the creation of 
subordinate Legislatures within the United Kingdom’.140 Speaker Lowther chaired another 
inquiry, into devolution. His earlier jigsaw puzzle had rationalised the conception of the 
electorate: all were free and equal, ‘but interchangeable. No account is taken of the difference 
in function of the voters, which the early constituencies at least tried to respect.’ In the 
interests of rationalising and equalising, a fishing or agricultural constituency brought up to 
the average of constituents ‘is nowadays loaded with any block of population, mining, urban-
dormitory, what you will.' For Walter Elliot, 'This is a very new development.’141 Rational it 
may not have been, but at least with the old Boroughs there was a rationale. 
 
‘It is the fashion to decry the Parliament of 1918’.142 Illegitimate issue of a cynical and 
peremptory consummation that was the 'Coupon Election'; for Asquith, it was ‘from first to 
last an artificial business.’143 Such an election, at least, would not happen again: in 1945 the 
dislocation may have been greater but the polity more settled. Moreover, in the testimony of 
one who witnessed both, the quality of the later intake was much more practised.144 By then, 
the Act had contributed to the greater nationalisation of voting in terms of class, politics, and 
religion; by compounding fishwives and farmers. Changes to constituency boundaries in 
1918 were considerable, but a similar number of Members was returned so the matter was of 
party more than parliamentary, significance. The story of franchise extension meant that just 
as the determinant of the government passed from the Commons to the country, legislative 
dominance passed from Commons to Cabinet, and, once electoral reform had been dropped, 
party triumphed. As one of those moved to take stock then acknowledged, ‘to oppose the 
Party System in this Year of Grace, 1919, is a work of supererogation’.145 
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Party government undermined parliamentary government; alongside the anomalous 
election outcome, the authority of the Commons was undermined, as if political principle had 
been by partisan chicanery. The 1918 election had inevitably disordered the two-party 
system. Only in 1924 was that system restored, albeit with a different two parties. Three 
general elections in three years between 1922 and 1924 gave scope to consider electoral 
reform, but there was little appetite outside Westminster and the commentariat. The system 
remained stable, and direct action and syndicalism were marginalised. The new prominence 
of party leaders served to reinforce the notion that, as the Chamber was directed by the 
executive, Members followed their leader more than they did their judgement. The Commons 
appeared merely as a legislature, rather than as the authority which could determine the 
existence of the executive. So far as women and redistribution were concerned, the war 
impeded but also impelled, rather as the great decline in the influence of the Commons 
detected by the Burke scholar Frank Raffety was ‘by no means due to the War’; it ‘has almost 
meant an eclipse.’146 The war suspended its power to determine, and the decline in its 
prestige followed.147 
The aftermath of Armageddon was conducive to great hyperbole as it was to sheer 
confusion. Much was said to be 'on trial' – parliamentary institutions in general, and the 
House of Commons in particular: ‘[i]t is not too much to say that the constitutional method is 
upon its last trial – and the sands are running out.’148 Single member plurality voting had 
survived and was unthreatened thereafter; female suffrage, PR, and Lords reform remained 
unresolved. Questions as to whether individual opinion had been transmitted into public 
action, or whether a system that was too centralised had been rectified continued, 
unanswered. The appeal of decentralisation, devolution and direct action was evident to 
some; to others, Parliament should be such voice as the nation possessed. That was why, as 
important as it was that the franchise had been extended and that redistribution had taken 
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place, the election which followed undermined much of the sense that good had been done. 
Such counsels were of perfection. It neither violated tradition nor broke from precedent that 
the House of Commons should not be representative of the people, but it had been subject to 
an act of reform nonetheless. 
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